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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH~ by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSIQ)J~ 
P lairttiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD C0:\1PA);Y~ 
a Delaware corporation~ 
Defendant and AppellanL 
BRIEF OF RESPOKDENT~ 
Case No. 9079 
This appeal has been brought by the Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, hereinafter referred 
to as Rio Grande~ from a judgment of condemnation of the 
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2· 
Pistrict Court of the Third Judicial D istrict:P wherein title 
to real property over which Rio Grande maintained a 
branch line~ otherwise known as Little Cottonwood Branch 
' 
was vested in the Road Commission of the State of Utah, 
hereinufter referred to as Road Commission~ The facts sur~ 
rounding the case are not specifically at issue nor do we 
disagree 'vith Appellant~s statement. However, in order 
to meet and properly refute the· allegations of Rio Grande~ 
we do deem it of importance to set forth the nature of the 
Cil se along with the basic facts which made it requisite 
for the Road Commission to condemn the subject property~ 
s~rA TEMEI\T OF FAC·TS 
The Road Commission~ pursuant to the Federal Aid 
Highviay Act of 1956, after comprehensive surveys and 
research, drew and projected plans for the construction 
and establishment of a public improvement, to wit, a state 
high\vay, it being designated as a portion of the Federal 
.ll_id Inter~tate Highway,. Route 1 and technically identi-
fied as Project ~ o. I-0 1-7 ( 3). 
V\Tith few exceptions, the location and termini of the 
interstate freeway were identified and settled through the 
Salt Lake 'l alley as early as the year 1950~ ~~ s the freeway 
enters the valley at the .Jordan Narrows., it proceeds gen-
erally in a northerly direction, passing without the main 
business districts of municipalities~ This hl g hwa y ~ 'vi th its 
multipJe Janes and complex interchanges ig subject in 
eonstruction and design to strict standards, pursuant to 
the Federal Aid Hlgh,vay .A.ct and the regulations of the 
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Federal Bureau of Public Roads. One such standard in-
cumbent on the Road Commission provides that no other 
structure, road or avenue, inclusive of railroad tracks} shall 
cross the interstate freeway at grade level. A further max-
im calls for the complete control of access to and from 
the freeway. Such freeway, as it extends through the City 
of Midvale, is immediately adjacent and to the east of the 
mainline tracks of Rio Grande. (R~ 18) A small spur line of 
Rio GrandeJ known as Little Cottonwood Branch, crosses 
the alignment of the interstate freeway and progresses in 
an easterly direction for approximately 1.75 mile, (R. 24) 
,~~here it services two customers on the east side of State 
Street. Uttle Cottonwood Branch is c·ontiguous to Center 
Street in 1\..Jidvale and due to a limited amount of traffic on 
the branch, the right of way was used for v-ehicular traffic 
also. 
It was initially proposed to improve and widen Center 
Street} leaving the branch trackage in place. Since the 
right of way of the Little Cottonwood crossed over the 
projected course of the free\vay~ a grade separation of some 
nature was mandatory+ Road Commi~sion authorities 
quickly rejected a proposal to construct a freeway overpass 
above I .. itt1e Cotton\vnod Branch and Center Street for 
se\'~eral cogent and outstanding reasons: 
( 1) The anticipated cost of an overpass structure ex~ 
ceeded $200,000, ~·hich was admittedly several times 
the value of Little Cot ton wood Branch; ( R. 1 f:l) 
(2) The overhead structure would obliterate sight vi~-
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i bility for vehicular traffic proceeding along Center 
Street in a w_esterly direction, prohibiting a safe ap-
proach to the Rio Grande mainline and thus creating 
a dangerous and hazardous intersection; (R. 20) 
~3) Center Streett a part of the state highway system 
and under the jurisdiction of the Road Commission, 
was in dire need of improvement and widening in 
order to facilitate present and future vehicular traffic) 
and the right of way of Little Cottonwood was within 
the area of the proposed improvement. { R. 14') 
Using this rational as a basis~ it was determined~ in 
order to eliminate the expense and hazardous conditions 
of a freeway overpass and to provide for the improvement 
of Center Street} that Little Cottonwood Branch should 
be acquired by purchase or othenvise and that an under-
pass shou1d be realized on Center Street beneath the 
interstate freeway and the mainline of Rio Grande. Such 
detennination was effectuated by a condemnation resolu-
tion of the Road Commission subsequent to unsuccessful 
negotiations between the interested parties+ Such resolu-
tion provides in part: 
·~RBSOI.-(VED by the State Road Commission of 
Utah that it finds and determines and hereby de-
clares that; 
4 
'The public intere~t and necessity require the 
acquisition~ construction and completion by the 
State Road Commission, of a public improvement~ 
namely a State Highway * * * 
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~~That portion of proposed highway contained 
within a strip of land approximately 270 feet wide 
adjacent to the easterly right of way line of the 
main line track of the Denver & Rio Grande West-
ern Railroadt being designated as a portion of the 
Federnl Aid Interstate Highway~ Route 11 and 
identified as Project No. I-01-7 (3), is planned and 
located in a manner which will be most compatible 
with the greatest public good and the least private 
injury and has been heretofore designated as a 
limited-access facility 1 as provided by Chapter 63~ 
Laws of Utah 1945; the balance being the improve-
ment and ytidening of Center Street in £ididvale 
City, Salt Lake County, identified as State Project 
1580~ 
* * :t: 
~'All of the right of way of the Little Cotton-
wood Branch of the Denver und Rio Crande West-
ern Railroad~ * * * /' 
STATE1viENT Ob~ POINTS 
POINT I 
ACQUISITIO~ OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD 
BRA!\JCH O·F RIO GRANDE IS FOR A PUBLIC 
PURPOSE. 
POINT II 
THE RESOL.l~TIOK OF THb R01\D COTvl-
~1ISSIO~ TO .A.CQC IRE THE SUBJECl' PROP-
ERTY CARRIES ~A.. PRBSU~\1PIO='f Oli .. VALIDJrl·-y 
Al\T_D IS PHl\-L_:\ ~'ACTE E\rlDRXCE OF, 'rHJ:G 
F.ACTS THEREl:-.J COI\'TAI='TED. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
POINT III 
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD COMMISSION 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY QUALIFIES AS 
A PUBLIC USE MORE NECESSARY THAN ITS 
FORMER PU-BLIC L:SE AS A PART OF A 
RAILROAD. 
POINT IV 
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD COMMISSION 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT FOR A 
POSSIBLE FUTURE L"SE. 
POINT V 
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD COMMISSION 
OF LITTLE COTrrON\VOOD BRANCH IS NOT 
FOR AN UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH 
COJ\1IviERCE. 
POI~T VI 
.~LL PARTIES INDISPENSA.BLE TO THE 
CO~PLETE DETERMINATION OF THE AC-
TION HAVE BEEN JOINED IN THE CAUSE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ACQUISITION OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD 
BRANCH OF RIO GRANDE IS FOR &"- PUBLIC 
PURPOSE. 
--rhe rule is well settled in substantially all jurisdic-
tions in this country that private property may not be 
taken involuntarily unless the use for which the property 
i~ acquired i~ public in nature. Basset v .. Swenson, 51 Ida. 
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256~ 5 P.2d 722; City of Menlo Park v~ Artino:r 151 Cat 
App.2d 261 1 311 P.2d 135; City and County of San Fran-
cisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52, 270 P.2d 488; Gravelly Ford 
Canal Co. v .. Pope arul Talbot Land Co .. ~ 36 Cal. App"2d 
556~ 178 P~ 150; Gilpin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co~ of New 
Y orkj 64 ?\LY .S~2d 436. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah· negatively limits 
the power of eminent domain to those instances where 
public purposes are involved. Article I~ Section 22 ~ 
provides: 
''Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use "\vithout just compensation.~' 
Legislative authorization in Utah spells out those uses 
which are to be considered public uses. See 78-34-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953~ as amended, a.nd 78-34-3 and 4j Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. Although the Legislature may in-
itially declare a particular use to be pub lie, the question 
isJ in the final analysis, one for the judiciary. University 
of Southern Calif. v .. Robbins:- 1 Cal. App.2d 523, 37 P.2d 
163. Though there are several tests which have been used 
by the courts in arriving at a public use determination~ 
we are in agreement with Rio Grande~H statement, con-
tained in its brief, that in the case at bar a discussion of 
the divergent theories is of no import: 
'l* * * for no better example of a public use can 
be found than that of a highway, • * * ~" .l\ppellanes 
Brief, page 127 
·rho procurement of property in order to construct 
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pub lie high\vays has been traditionally considered a public 
use. State v. Fourth Judicial District Court~ 94 Utr 384J 78 
P.2d S02; Barnes v~ Wade, 90 Ut. 1, 58 P.2d 297 .. As to the 
question of what constitutes a public use under the em-
inent domain statute, the Vtah Supreme Court has allowed 
for a broad interpretationL Town of Perry v. Tharn..as~ 82 
Ut. 159, 22 P2d. 343. 
'rhe interstate free\vay, as it passes through the Salt 
Lake Valley, performs the vital function of providing 
ready~ quick and safe mode for vehicular traffic. It serves 
not only residents of Salt Lake County and Utah but also 
citizens of other states and the public in general. In the 
design and construction of this facility, the safety and 
security that must be afforded to traffic~ not only on the 
free\vay i lsel f but also on any connecting or adjoining 
avenues, is a primary consideration. The Road Commission 
has an obligation in seeing that the interstate freeway is 
so con~t.ructed and maintained that dangerous overpasses 
and interchanges are reduced to a minimum+ 
There is abundance of testimony in the record that a 
freeV\.'~ay overpass was not considered advisable due to 
re strictcd sight distance that would result relative to traf-
fie along Center Street in approaching the main tracks of 
Rio Grande. (_R+ 36, ~7) 38.) The appellant~ while admitting 
the rigl1t of the Road Commi~sion to condemn, alleges that 
only that part of Little Cottonwood which immediately 
crosses the path and tertnlni of the interstate freeway is 
req ul1·ed and that, therefore, the Road Conim.ission has 
exceeded consti tu tiona I limitations in acquiring the entire 
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branchj for the remainder is not related to a public use. 
Appellant overlooks the fact that the resolution of the 
Road Commission cites that the property to be acquired 
through condemnation was to be utilized not only for the 
Federal Aid Interstate Highway but also for the improve-
ment and \Videning of Center Street in 1\1idvale Cityj which 
is part of the state system of highways. Thus, it is seen 
that the subject property was acquired for the dual pur~ 
poses of the interstate freeway and Center Street in ~fid­
vale City~ both admittedly public improvements and uses. 
POI)J'r II 
rrHE RESOLUTION OF ,.rHI£ ROAD COlVI-
l1ISSION TO ACQUIRE TIIB St~DJECT PUOP-
ERrr'{ CARRTES A PRESUMPIO~ 0}~. VALIDIT.Y 
..:-\:-.JD IS PRll\.f~l\ F1\ClE E.\riDEKCE OF TIIE 
FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED. 
Point I and Point III of Rio Grande's brief allege 
that the Road Commission had no authority to condemn 
the Little Cotton\vood Branch on the ground that there 
'vas no pubJlc purpose connected therewith. The resolu-
tion of the Road Commission in turn states that the real 
property is essential for public improvements, that the 
project has been located and planned in a manner that 
i~ most compatible '"'"~ith the greatest public good and the 
least private injury~ and that the public interest and nc-
cessit.\· demund that such property be acquired. We believe 
it to be the la\v in this jurisdiction that a decision of an 
administrative body is entitled to a presumption of cor~ 
rectness and validity, is prima facie evidence of the facts 
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therein contained~ and must be accepted unless such is 
unreasonable or unless the body is arbitrary or capricious, 
in which case the burden of showing such rests lNith 
that individual who seeks to set the decision aside. Hotel 
Utah Co. v~ IndttStrial Comm. 11 116 Ut. 443~ 211 P42d 200; 
Park Utah Cons. Mines Co. v. Indu.strial Comm.~ 84 Ut. 
481, 36 P.2d 9794 
Latimer, J., in writing for this Court in the case of 
Goodrich v. Public Service CCJrrnm., 114 Utr 296J 198 P.2d 
975, had this to say: 
'~We have repeatedly held that in reviewing 
cases certified to this court from the Public Service 
Commission on a statement of error that the Com-
mission~s reportt findings, conclusions and order 
are unlawful~ we are limited in our review to as-
certaining whether or not the Commission had be-
fore it substantial evidence upon which to base its 
decision. Only in the event that we find the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreason-
ably in denying applicant's petition can we set 
aside the order.'' 
The effect of a decision of the Public Service Commis-
sion would not be greater in any event~ than a decision 
of the Road Commission. Rio Grande has adduced no ar-
gument which indicates or in any way evidences that the 
resolution of the Road Commission to acquire l.r it tie Cot-
tonwood Branch 'vas arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable~ 
POINT III 
/J...CQUISITION BY THE R01\D COJVIMTSSIO~ 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY QUALIFIES AS 
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A PUBT. .. Tl: USE l\iORE NECESSARY THAN ITS 
FOllMER PU·BLIC USE AS A PART OF A 
RAILROAD. 
If the law announced in this state is that private 
property may not be acquired by the condemnor unless 
such property be placed to a public use, it is equally settled 
that property initially devoted to a public use may be ac-
quired under the eminent domain statute for a purpose 
which is of a more public nature .. North Salt Lake v. St4 
Joseph Water and Irr. Co .. ~ 118 UL 600, 223 P+2d 577 .. This 
principle is a matter subject to the wisdom of the Legis-
lature. Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, (Colo.) 
248 P.2d 732. In this connection, 78-34-3, Utah Code An-
notated 1953~ states in part: 
'~The private property which may be taken 
under this chapter includes: 
~ ~ (3) Propert):-- appropriated to public use; pro~ 
vided, that such property shall not be taken unless 
for a more necessary public use than that to "\\Thich 
it has been already appropriated.n 
See also 78-34-4~ U.C.A. 1953. Railroad property has been 
subjected to acquisition for another public use more neces ... 
sary. Elberton Southern Ry Co. v. Georgia State Highway 
Dept~~ 211 Ga .. 838, 89 S.E.2d 645~ Syracuse Grade Crossing 
Comm. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 197 Misc. 192, 97 
~'J.Y. 5. 2d 279. 
It is beyond argument that the use of the right of way 
of Little Cottonwood Branch for the construction of the 
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12 
interstate freeway and the improvement and vridening of 
Center Street in Midvale constitutes a public use more 
vital and necessary than the previous employment as a 
bran.ch of Rio Grande~ Traffic anaylses reveal that more 
than 8~000 vehicles cross the Cottonwood Branch tracks 
on Center Street daily and the projected estimate of future 
vehicular traffic along said street will greatly exceed such 
sumr (R. 23.) Thls is to be compared with the small rail 
truffic which Rio Grande conducts on Little Cottonwood. 
POINT IV 
ACQUISITIO~ B\~ THE ROAD COMMISSION 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOrr FOR A 
POSSIBLE FUTURE USE. 
Point II of Rio Grandets brief sets forth that the Road 
Commission is not empowered to condemn for possible 
future use~ (A.ppellanfs Brief~ p. 14.) :--Jo authority is cited 
for such argument nor is; any reasoning put forward to 
substantiated this contention. It could be said without res-
ervati on that the \Vord ff futurej' is relative in scope and 
theoretically might apply to any situation wherein the 
Road Commission did not utilize the property for high,vay 
purposes at the precise moment that it sought to acquire 
the parceL Such an interpretation is~ of course, hardly 
predicated upon the genuine administration of justice. 
Even were we to assume that a future use were involved 
in the case at bar, 27 -9-4~ l 1. C.~;\. 1953, provides an effec~ 
live an s \\-' er ~ far it dec lares that with respect to limited 
access facilities~ the high way authorities of the state rna y 
acquire land even though the property is not immediately 
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13 
needed for the right of way proper if the interests of the 
public "Will be best served. Be that as it may~ the instant 
situation does not involve the acquisition of property for 
future purposes. 
It takes not an expert to realize that the planning~ 
construction~ improvement and maintenance of modern-
day highways is not an overnight operation~ The surveys, 
public hearings, plans and designs:t purchase or acquisition 
of right of way leading up to the construction phase is an 
intricate and c-om.p lica ted process, requiring years of time 
and large outlays of public monies+ The plans and specifi-
cations of the interstate freeway have been on the draw-
ing boards and in the conference rooms for ten years. It 
would be rash to advocate that acquisition of property, in 
order that final. and conclusive plans and specifications 
might be accomplished and in order that bids might be 
received and con tracts let:t constitutes a future use+ 
In the absence of procuring Little Cottonwood Branch~ 
the Road Commission was at a deadend in respect to the 
ultimate reconstruction and improvement of Center Street 
and iliitial construction of the interstate freeway. A pres-
ent use was involved .. 
Although it is not clear~ it appears that Rio Grande 
asserts that the course of the interstate freeway is depen-
dent upon the routing of a collateral spur line of Rio 
GrandeJ known as the Bingham-Garfield Branch, and that 
Little Cottonwood Branch may not, consequently, be ne-
cessary for freeway usage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) This 
we believe to be a self-molded conclusion, unwarranted 
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and unsupported by the record now on appeat No testi-
mony was brought out at any hearing which indicated 
that the condemnation resolution of the Road Commission 
was a tentative proposal, subject to change at a later time. 
POINT V 
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD CQ)L\IISSIOK 
OF LirrTLE COTTONWOOD BRANCH IS KOT 
i\01 UNLA VJFUL INTERFEREKCE WITH 
COI\iMERCE. 
Article I~ Section 8, of the Federal Constitution pro-
vides that the Congress of the United States shall regulate 
commerce among the several states~ This clause has been 
interpreted to mean that no state may interfere substan-
tially with the flow of interstate commerce .. Gibbons v. Og-
den, 9 Wheat 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; Brown v. Houston~ 114 U.S. 
622~ 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L~Ed. 257. Rio Grande maintains 
in this action that the acquisition of the Road Commission 
of Little Cottonwood Branch establishes an unlawful in-
terference 'vith commerce. 
The constitutional prohibition invalidates only those 
acts of the ~tate \Vhich substantially and unreasonably 
impede and interfere with the conduct of Rio Grande~s 
business~ S~ C~ Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.~ 303 l~.S~ 
177, 58 S.Ct. 510~ 82 L.Ed~ 734. {1/lr. Chief Justice Stone, in 
a case v~.rhich Rio Grande cites, declared that: 
~'"\Vhen the regulation of matters of local con-
cern is local in chJracter and effect~ and its impact 
on the national commerce does not seriously inter-
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fere with its operation, and the consequent incen-
tive to deal 'vith them nationally is slight:t ~uch 
regulation has been generally held to be 1-vithin 
state authority/' Southern -Pac. Cor v. State of Ariz~_t 
~32.5 U .. S. 761) 65 S.Ct. 1515. 
The acquisition by the Road Commission or Little Cotton-
wood is of small consequence when rated against the total 
volume of business enacted by Rio Grande in Utah and 
in neighboring states. So a I so is the amount of railroad 
traffic on the branch minute \vhen paralleled to the public 
necessity of well-bui 1 tt safely designed and maintained 
highways. The case of Kansas Southern Ry. v .. Kaw l,..alley 
Drairwge District, 233 V~S. 75 cited by Rio Grande, is to 
be distinguished from the immediate situation. In that 
case Ka\v Valley, under the guise of the police power~ 
ordered the Railroad to raise the elevation of its bridges 
and to remove old bridges. Such r.a~e did not involve the 
right of the state of Kansas to condemn a railroad branch 
line serving but t\vo customers, but rather centered around 
an order to remove, without compensation~ railroad fac il-
ities. The Supreme Court of the United States held, and 
\Ve think justifiably so, that such order constituted a direct 
interference \\~ith interstate oommerce. The Kaw Valley 
case is to be further distinguished from the instant situa-
tion on the basis that the bridges required to be removed 
therein \Vere the connecting link of the interstate artery 
(lf the Kansas Southern Railroad) V•l hile the Lit tie Cotton-
\vood Branch is exhausted less than t\vo miles after it 
leaves the mainline trackage of Rio Grande. 
In Elberton Southern Ry. v. Georgia State Highway 
Dept.) 211 Ca~ 838~ 89 S.E.2d 64ft1 the highway department 
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acquired by condenmation property formerly devoted to 
railroad purposes4 In answer to the railroadts plea that 
the eminent domain action brought by the state destroyed 
the former's power to perform its public duty as a public 
carrier in interstate commerce~ the Georgia court held that 
there was no direct and substantial interference with the 
conduct of the railroad's operations. The Elberton case is 
persuasive authority. The Bd. of Hudson River Regulating 
District v+ Forula~ J. & G. Ry. Co., 249 ~.Y. 445~ 164 N.E. 
541~ is likewise to the effect that the condemnation of 
railroad property for the benefit of a river regulating dis-
trict is not an unlawful interference with interstate com-
merce. The· acquisition by the Road Commlssion of LTtah 
of Little Cottonwood Branch must be deemed an incidental 
interruption of commerce. 
POINT VI 
ALL PARTIES Il\"DISPENSABLE TO THE 
COMPLETE DETERMI~ATION OF THE AC-
TIO~ HAVE BEEN JOIKED J)J THE CAUSE. 
Rio Grande has maintained that its customers whom 
it services on the- Little Cottonwood Branch and with 
whom contracts are negotiated, are indispensable parties 
to this action and obtain a compensable interest in the 
subject real property. It would be unjustified to dignify 
this assertion by an extended discussion. It is sufficient 
to say that the constitution and statutes of the State of 
Utah contemplate that the right of eminent domain shall 
be exercised as to all recognized interests in the real prop-
erty acquired. Rio Grande is the sole and exclusive ov.rner 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
of the right of way under consideration. We have yet to 
find a case \vherein an individual holding nothing more 
than a business contract with the condemnee was held to 
po~gess a com_pensable and cognizable interest in a con-
demnation action, and if such were the law, then, quite 
naturally, the costs of acquiring any property for highway 
purposes would be prohibitive. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of condemnation of the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L~ BL"DGE 
Attorney General 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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